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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
~
Plaintiff and Respondent,

JOH;·EDWARDS,

(

Case
No. 9525

Defendarnt and Appellant. }

BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENT
NATURE OF CASE
The defendant was convicted of profiting by the earnings of fallen women in violation of 76-53-10, U.C.A. 1953,
upon trial in the Second Judicial District, and claims
errors of evidence require reversal and a new trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT
The State seeks the affirmance of the jury's decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State will adopt the preliminary statement of
facts set out in the defendant's brief as being essentially
1
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correct, but will add facts contained in the record where
relevant to the issues raised on appeal.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT

I.

THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT
CONCERNING HIS WIFE'S PLEA OF GUILTY
TO THE CHARGE OF PROSTITUTION WAS
RELEVANT TO IMPEACH THE DEFENDANT
CONCERNING HIS ASSERTIONS AS TO HER
GOOD CHARACTER AND ON OTHER ISSUES.
POINT

II.

THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT
CONCERNING HIS PREVIOUS STAYS IN JAIL
AND CONVICTIONS WAS RELEVANT TO IMPEACH THE DEFENDANT SINCE HE PLACED
HIS CHARACTER INTO ISSUE AND MADE
STATEMENTS CONCERNING HIS ACTIVITIES WHICH WERE INCONSISTENT WITH
THE FACTS OF SUCH JAIL STAYS AND
CONVICTIONS.
POINT

III.

THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE DEFENDANT WAS WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF PROPER
CROSS-EXAMINATION.
PorNT

IV.

THE COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS AND HIS WIFE'S PLEA OF GUILTY
SHOULD BE LIMITED TO CREDIBILITY WAS
NOT ERROR.
2
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ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I.

THE CROSS-EXAI'vHNATION OF DEFENDANT
CONCERNING HIS WIFE'S PLEA OF GUILTY
TO THE CHARGE OF PROSTITUTION WAS
RELEVANT TO Il'APEACH THE DEFENDANT
CONCERNING HIS ASSERTIONS AS TO HER
GOOD CHARACTER AND ON OTHER ISSUES.
The defendant has contended that because he was
cross-examined as to his wife's plea of guilty to the
crime of prostitution, that the trial court thus committed
prejudicial error. The record discloses the following relevant facts relating to that issue. After the prosecution
had presented its case, defense counsel made his opening statement in which he said with reference to the
defendant's wife. (R. 39):
"His wife is not a fallen woman which I think will
come out later, which is one of the elements that
the prosecution is required to prove.''
Thereafter, the defendant took the stand and testified
(R. 42):

'' Q. To your your knowledge, what type of woman
is your wife~
''A. My wife is a working woman and kind of a
business woman. She don't believe in doing wrong.
She doesn't curse.

"Q. Would you call your wife a fallen

woman~

''A. I believe she is true to her husband and I
believe she is a woman that don't do prostitute
because I have never known her to do it."
3
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On cross-examination the following occurred: (R. 45)

"Q. You testified that she didn't practice prostitution~

"A. No, sir, she doesn't I know that.

'' Q. You testified that you have known this and
you know that she would never do such a thing~
"A. Yes, sir, I never knowed her to do that, sir.
That is the truth that Jesus could tell you.

"Q. Now you were with your wife when she was
booked in this police station the night of February
17, booked for prostitution~"
"MR. FRoRER: Objection.
''THE CouRT: Ojection is overruled. You may
ask.''

'' Q. You were right there when she was booked
for prostitution and gave her name Shirley Jean
Edwards and stated she was your wife~
''A. Yes, sir.

"Q. You are aware of the fact that she plead
guilty to that charge are you not~
''A. Well, she didn't know what prostitution
means because she had never heard of prostitution
in her life. In fact she can't hardly speak English. She don't know what the word prostitution
means. I have never spoke that word to her.

"Q. You have never spoke such a word to

her~

"A. That is right."
Further at pages 49-50 :

"Q. And your wife wouldn't know what the word
prostitution meant~
''A. No, she doesn't know.
4
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''Q. That is why she plead guilty to the

charge~

''A. Yes, sir.

•

•

*

'' Q. You say your wife is a good woman and has
worked regularly~
''A. Yes, sir.

'' Q. And hasn't been around jails or anything of
that sort to even know what this thing means~
"A. No, sir."
It should be further noted that the Trial Judge, in
instructing the jury, required finding that the woman in
question would act as a prostitute (R. 11), and further
noted that defendant had denied that his wife ever indicated a willingness to so act (R. 41).
It is submitted that based upon the above record, the
prosecutor acted well within the bounds of proper demeanor in questioning the defendant. The defendant contends that State v. Justesen, 35 Utah 105, 99 Pac. 456
(1909), stands for the proposition that the action of the
prosecutor in questioning the defendant with reference
to his wife's conviction was error. It does not. The Justess en case involved the attempt of the prosecutor to offer
the record of a plea of guilty of a co-conspirator who
committed perjury where the defendant was charged with
subordination. The offer was a direct attempt to use the
plea of guilty as independent proof in support of the
crime charged when not relevant.
The instant situation is not so concerned. In the
instant case the matter was brought out on cross-exami5
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nation to rebut and attack the veracity of the defendant
with reference to his assertions as to his wife's character.
This is an entirely different situation than that raised in
Justesen. People v. Fa,rrell, 11 Utah 414, 40 Pac. 703
(1895) is no authority for defendant's contentions either,
since it merely stands for the proposition that the admission of a co-conspirator is not admissible after the
conspiracy has ceased. The conclusion results that none
of the authorities cited by defendant support the contention of error.
It will be conceded that a plea of guilty by one of two
persons charged with a crime arising from the same
incident is not usually admissible as against the other to
prove guilt, but must otherwise become relevant. In this
instance, the fact that the defendant's wife plead guilty
was directly relevant to impeach the defendant's veracity
with respect to his wife's character. In State v. Haugensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P.2d 229 (1936), it was noted:
''There are two methods of discrediting evidence.
First, to show that the evidence itself is untrue
and unreliable; and second, to show that the transmitter of the testimony is unreliable, either because of bad memory, failure to accurately record
impressions, or because of lack of veracity.''
In the instant case, where the defendant saw fit to
put his wife's character in issue, the fact that she had
plead guilty to the crime of prostitution tended to impeach the defendant's assertion that she ·was a woman of
excellent character, and thus impeached the transmitter's
veracity. Therefore, the cross-examination was directly
6
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relevant to the second form of discrediting evidence noted
in the H ougensen case.
In Michelson v. United States,. 335 U. S. 469 (1948),
the United States Supreme Court recognized that it was
permissible to inquire of a witness who testifies as to the
good character o~ reputation of a defendant, whether
they were aware of the defendant's arrest some 26 years
before. The Court noted that :
"It was proper cross-examination because reports
of his arrest for receiving stolen goods, if admitted, would tend to weaken the assertion that he
was known as an honest and law abiding citizen.
The cross-examination may take in as much
ground as the testimony it is designed to verify.
To hold otherwise would give defendant the benefit of testimony that he was honest and law-abiding in reputation when such might not be the
fact; * * *."
By the same token, to allow the defendant in the instant
case to falsely assert that his wife was a woman of chaste
and proper character, where he knew of the fact that she
plead guilty to prostitution, would allow him to assert
as a fact, something which, in view of her plea, may definitely not be true, and which, if he knew of her plea, would
tend to diminish the veracity of his testimony. Thus the
cross-examination was perfectly proper to attack the defendant's veracity. Indeed, even the defendant recognizes
that it was so admissible for credibility purposes. (Defendant's Brief, p. 14.)
It is submitted that a second reason exists why the
evidence was properly admitted. The defendant at7
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tempted to defend against the crime charged by asserting that his wife was of good character, and since his
wife was of good character and would not engage in
prostitution, that he could not, as a result, be guilty of
procuring her for the purposes of prostitution. Thus,
the character of the defendant's wife, a third person, was
placed in issue by the defendant. In such a case the
evidence of the wife's plea tended to directly refute the
claim of her good character, and was for that reason admissible. Sutton v. State, 124 Ga. 815, 53 S.E. 381 (1906).
The rule is noted in Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec.
68, where it is said:
"Where the character offered is that of a third
person, not a party to the cause, the reasons of
policy for exclusion seem to disappear or become
inconsiderable; hence if there is a.ny relevancy in
the fact of character, i. e. if some act is involved
upon the probability of which a moral trait can
throw light, the character may well be received."
(Emphasis supplied)
In this instance the defendant placed the character
of his wife in issue to dissipate the claim of his guilt, and
cannot protest at having her character attacked to refute
his claim.
Finally, a third basis exists whereby the cross-examination of defendant on such an issue is relevant and admissible. It is based upon the fact that the defendant's
wife's character was a matter of evidence. Thus, the defense counsel noted that it must be proven that the
defendant's wife was a "fallen woman," and the trial
8
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court instructed on the elements such as to make the prosecution bear the burden of proving the woman, defendant's wife, to be a prostitute. Under these circumstances,
the wife's character was an evidentiary issue. Wigmore,
Evidence, 3rd Ed., Vol. I, p. 491, 509. Thus, as to the
particular class of crime with which the defendant was
here charged, an exception for the purposes of proving
character arises. Thus, it is noted in Wigmore, op. cit.,
Sec. 204:
"It has already been seen that, apart from statutes constituting the repute of the house as the
sole element of the crime of professional pandering, the character or use of the house and the
character or occupation of the inmates may come
into issue. Two questions having a bearing here
are thus presented. (1) May particular instances
of prostitution in the house be offered, as showing
its habitual character~ (2) May particular acts
of prostitution by the inmates be offered, as showing their occupation or character as prostitutes?
Both these questions should be answered in the
affirmative * * *." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, as Wigmore notes, where character is itself an element or matter of proof, specific instances of prostitution
or actions of such a nature are relevant. See State v. Tacconi, 110 Utah 212, 171 P. 2d 388 (1946) for a similar conclusion. In proving such character, the Supreme Court of
North Dakota, in State v. Simpson, 78 N.D. 360, 49 N.W.
2d 777 (1951), noted, where the charge was keeping a
bawdy house :
"One of the essential matters that the state had to
prove was that the defendant maintained a house
where illicit sexual intercourse was indulged in
9
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contrary to the temporary injunction issued. The
evidence that Judy Cox had been proceeded
against and had plead guilty to prostitution in
that house was very material to the issue raised.
It bore directly on the character of the house maintained by the defendant.''
The Court held the plea of guilty was properly admitted
under 42-0207 NDRC 1943. The plea of guilty thus went
to the issue of the character of a third person that was
itself relevant. In the instant case, the woman's character was relevant and her plea tended to prove that element and thus be admissible. In State v. Taccowi, supra,
the fact that the woman forfeited bail in answer to the
offense was admitted.
Thus, for three reasons, the defendant's position is
not well taken. First, the evidence tended to impeach
the defendant's veracity. Second, it rebutted the direct
assrtions as to defendant's wife's character with its relation to his. Finally, it was directly relevant to an element
of character in issue.
PoiNT

II.

THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT
CONCERNING HIS PREVIOUS STAYS IN JAIL
AND CONVICTIONS VI AS RELEVANT TO IMPEACH THE DEFENDANT SINCE HE PLACED
HIS CHARACTER INTO ISSUE AND MADE
STATEMENTS CONCERNING HIS ACTIVITIES WHICH WERE INCONSISTENT WITH
THE FACTS OF SUCH JAIL STAYS AND
CONVICTIONS.
10
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The defendant contends that the prosecutor's crossexamination on his previous convictions for drunkenness
and other misdemeanors was error. It is submitted, however, that an analysis of the record will show the examination to have been proper.
On direct examination the accused testified (R. 41) :

" * * * I have been working for her honestly. I
have never sold her to no man in my life. Honest
to God I haven't. I have never sold my wife and
I wouldn't do that and I believe in the Bible. I
believe in God Almighty too. My dad is a twentysecond degree Masonic.''
The defendant testified, in addition, that he had been
drinking with one of the prosecution's witnesses for two
or three days prior to the day of the incident, and that he
had been drinking on that day also (R. 40, 41). He further testified that he had had about two fifths to drink
so far that day, and maybe three (R. 42). He further
noted that he thought the detective he had approached
was going to take he and his wife to a liquor store (R. 41).
On cross-examination the following occurred (R. 52):

"Q. You state you have worked regularly and
supported your wife1
"A. Yes, sir. I have been working ever since I
have been with her. I worked in Idaho until the
spuds were over, this past summer up here in
Rupert. I worked all over Idaho and Blackfoot,
I worked in Toole Lake, California, loading spuds.
I worked on the harvest all the time. I worked
hard.
11
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"Q. You state that you wouldn't do such a thing
as to pander or something like that~
''A. No, sir. I raise my hand to Jesus and expect
to go to hell if I did. It is the truth. I expect to go
to hell when I die if I say that because Ialways
believe in God and I continue to believe in Him.

"Q. You were not working on June 9,1960, in Las
V geas, Nevada, were you~ You were not working
on that day~
''A. No, sir, I guess, I worked for a Jew down
there for awhile.

''Q. Did you spend some time in jail down in Las
Vegas, Nevada, for being drunk~''
"~IR.

FRoRER: I object.

''THE CouRT: The objection is overruled, you may
ask him.''

"Q. That is June 9, 1960, in Las Vegas, Nevada.
You were not working then, were you~
''A. I was working there when I was there, yes
sir, for a Jew there.
'' Q. How long were you in jail down there for
being drunk during the month of June~

''A. Well, I think it was 10 or 15 days, something
like that. It may have been one day. I don't exactly know the month. I know I was in there for
being drunk, that is what I did time for, is being
drunk.

"Q. Let's go back in the month before that, May
24, 1960, just less than a month before. The month
of May, you were not working during that month,
were you full time Y
''A. I have been working off and on. I never
missed a month of work in my life.

12
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"Q. You were in jail in Los Angeles part of the
time, for being drunk in a public

place~''

''A. I guess I was not, I was working for a Jew.

'' Q. You working in the month of May of 1960 ~
"A. You can't work when you are in jail."

A reading of the record from pages 52-55 demonstrates
that the prosecution's cross-examination was proper for
at least three reasons. First, it appears clear that on both
direct and cross-examination the accused attempted to
show that he was an honest, hard-working person, who
kept employed all the time in an effort to support his wife,
and thus would not resort to such activities as pandering.
The defendant injected his own character into the proceedings, and thus opened the door for the prosecution
to rebut. The defendant notes that some Utah cases have
said that impeachment is limited to felonies, 1 but such is
not the case where a defendant puts his or another's character in issue. In such instances, rebuttal of the character
trait by any means relevant thereto is permissible. State
v. Thompson, 58 Utah 291, 199 Pac. 161 (1921); State v.
Mares, 113 Utah 225, 192 P. 2d 861 (1948). Wigmore has
noted the rule in the following terms :
''After a defendant has attempted to show his
good character in his own aid, prosecution may
in rebuttal offer as evidence his bad character.
The true reason for this seems to be, not any relaxation of the principle, just mentioned, i.e. not a
1

The defendant cites State v. Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P. 2d 229
(1936) as the last case supporting a line of Utah cases requiring impeachment by felony. However, p. 370 of the Court's opinion would
appear to leave the matter to the trial court's discretion so as to allow
proof of misconduct not amounting to a felony. Wigmore has so interpreted this case. Wigmore, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 613.

13
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permission to show the defendant's bad character,
but a liberty to refute his claim that he was a good
one. Otherwise a defendant, secure from refutation, would have too clear a license unscrupulously to impose a false character upon the tribunal.''
Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 58.
The defendant, having placed his good character in
issue, so far as steady employment, work habits, and honesty, the prosecution was entitled to refute the implications of such traits of good character. Although it may
be argued that this should not include reference to specific misconduct, it is the general rule that specific acts of
misconduct may be shown on cross-examination of the
witness himself. Wigmore, op. cit., Sec. 981, notes:
''The reasons already examined appear plainly to
have no effect in forbidding the extraction of the
facts of misconduct from the witness himself on
cross-examination.''
See also Tracy, Handbook of the Law of Evidence (1960),
p. 177.
In the instant case the defendant's character trait
for steady employment was in issue, and the prosecution
properly examined as to matters which demonstrated that
his work habits were not such as he claimed, and factors
which were directly relevant to his honesty. It therefore
appears that the actions of the prosecution were proper.
Second, and closely associated with the :first contention, is the fact that the accused, by his testimony,

14
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attempted to show a. steady pattern of employment.
(R. 39, 43, 44, 45, 52) Thus, evidence that a. substantial
part of his time was spent in jail because of drunkenness
or vagrancy is directly relevant to disprove the employment assertions. Sta.te v. Hougensen., 91 Utah 351, 64 P.
2d 229 (1936). The evidence was directly contradictory
to the defendant's previous assertion, and was, therefore,
directly relevant. 2 Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sees.
1000 et seq.
Third, it is submitted that cross-examination as to
these matters, when coupled with the other evidence of
record demonstrating scanty employment, plus excessive
drinking habits, forms a motive for the crime. The evidence of the other criminal misconduct demonstrating a
habitual and uncontrolled use of liquor, and also demonstrating vagrancy and limited employment, when added
to the evidence showing extensive drinking on the day
of the incident, tends to show a motive for the commission of the crime, that being to obtain money with which
to buy more booze, and thus an exception to the rule as
to when other crimes may be shown. McCormick, Evidence, p. 330; Wigmore, supra, Sec. 391; State v. Tacconi,
110 Utah 212, 171 P. 388 (1946). Thus, as is noted in
Tracy, supra, p. 331 :
"To show a motive for the perpetration of a crime,
the prosecution may offer evidence of the commission of a similar or different crime, if a logical
2

The inconsistenecies between the defendant's statement that he and his
wife worked full time, and that his wife was a good woman, appear of
record on pages 50-56.

15
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inference as to motive can be drawn from such
evidence.' '
The defendant's motive for commission of the crime was
to obtain money to continue drinking. The evidence of
habitual or frequent drunkenness to the point of public
offense and vagrancy, would tend to supply the obvious
motive for the crime. Thus the examination, tending,
as it did, to reveal the motive behind the act, was proper.
In addition, it is noted that in State v. Hougensen,
supra p. 370, that the court, in one of eleven principles
of cross-examination, said:
"Questions whose only object could be to call for
answers to affect the credibility of the ·witness and
which answers could tend to degrade his or her
character, but not tend to subject such witness to
punishment for a felony, are permissible over a
general objection as to their relevancy or competency, in the sound discretion of the court.''
Thus, the admissibility of such matter is properly left to
the discretion of the Trial Judge, and certainly the Trial
Judge acted properly here in exercising his discretion.
PoiNT

III.

THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE DEFENDANT WAS WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF PROPER
CROSS-EXAMINATION.
The contention that the cross-examination of
the defendant should be deemed cumulative error,
and thus be held prejudicial, is without merit in view of
the fact that the examination was legally proper on many
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bases. The examination appended to the defendant's
brief concerns the arrests and jail terms of the defendant's wife and himself. It should be remembered that the
defendant testified on direct examination as to the good
character of his wife. On cross-examination, in addition to the matter appended to the defendant's brief, the
record discloses (R. 50) :

"Q. You say your wife is a good woman and has
worked regularly~
"A. Yes, sir.
'' Q. And hasn't been around jails or anything of
that sort to even know what this thing means~

"A. No, sir."
Thus the evidence of the defendant's wife's stay in jail
and convictions for drunkenness directly tended to refute
the defendant's statement and impeach him. There was
nothing improper in such examination. State v. Herrera,
8 U. 2d 188, 330 P. 2d 1086 (1958) is no authority for defendant's claim of error. There the defendant was crossexamined as to extraneous offenses that he was supposed
to have committed, and which were not directly related to
character or other issues before the court. In the instant
case the defendant and a third person's character were
before the Court, direct in issue, and used by defendant
to support his claim of innocence. Examination in relation to this subject was wholly proper.
Defendant points out that no attempt was made to
prove some of the offenses. It should be noted that the
abstract of evidence reflects not that the defendant denied
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the incidents, but that he did not remember or know the
specific incidents. Under such circumstances, the testimony is neutral and there is nothing to contradict. In
addition, such proof was rendered unnecessary because
the defendant admitted being in jail all the time, but
could not remember exactly when. The record shows
on p. 54:

"Q. Do you want to deny that you were in jail of
May of 1960? I want to remind you that you have
taken an oath.

''A. I don't know if I was in jail in May for getting drunk. I know I get in for being drunk all
the time, but I work all the time."
Thus, the defendant admitted the veracity of the crossexamination and no need for additional proof was required, since it would merely have been cumulative.
Cross-examination is one of the essential weapons of
the prosecution, as well as defense, and in cases where the
State may have to reply on only one or two witnesses to
affirmatively prove its case, it may be the major weapon,
especially where the defendant's story is directly inopposite. If the examination is within recognized rules of
evidence, courts should be reluctant to say examination
exceeds the bounds of propritey. It is submitted that the
examination in the instant case was well within the limits
approved by the court in State v. Turner, 95 Utah 129,
79 P. 2d 46 (1938), and hence there is no merit to the
contention that it was prejudicial.
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PoiNT

IV.

THE COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS AND HIS WIFE'S PLEA OF GUILTY
SHOULD BE LIMITED TO CREDIBILITY WAS
NOT ERROR.
The defendant finally contends that the Trial Judge
should have instructed that the evidence of the def{3ndant 's convictions, and his wife's plea of guilty, should be
considered by the jury only with relation to the defendant's credibility.
The record reflects that the defendant was given full
opportunity to request special instructions and to take
exceptions (R. 68, 69), and although defense counsel was
concerned with the instructions and took an exception, no
exception or special request was made for the instruction
the defendant now contends should have been given. A
substantial number of cases have said that under these
circumstances there is a waiver, and no basis for reversal
exists on appeal. People v. Gray, 66 Cal. 271, 5 Pac. 240;
Naverrete v. State, 40 S.W. 791 (Tex. Crirn.); People v.
Bransfield, 289 Ill. 72, 124 N.E. 365; People v. Darr, 262
Ill. 203, 104 N.E. 389; Stale v. Williams, 94 Vi. 426, 111
A. 701; Cobb v. Follansbee, 79 N. H. 205, 107 A. 630;
State v. Fran.cis, 58 Mont. 659, 194 Pac. 304; State v.
Stokes, 288 Mo. 539, 232 S.W. 106; People v. Rubalcado,
56 Cal. App. 440,205 Pac. 709; Schonfeld v. United States,
277 F. 934; Bowman v. Commonwealth, 261 Ky. 215, 87
S.W. 2d 355. The Utah Supreme Court stated in Stale v.
Greene, 33 Utah 497, 94 Pac. 987 (1908):
19
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"* * *the rule as declared by the great weight of
authority seems to be that evidence which is competent for certain purposes, and is incompetent for
other purposes, but is admitted generally, it is
incumbent upon the party objecting to its reception, if he desires to have the effect of such evi.,
dence limited to the specific purpose for which it is
admissible, to ask the Court to inform the jury by
appropriate instructions as to the purpose for
which they may consider the evidence, and, if he
fails to make the request, he cannot afterwards be
heard to complain.''
The defendant relies upon State v. McCurtain, 52
Utah 53, 172 Pac. 481 (1918) as supporting a requirement
that the instruction should be given anyway. The decision does not so hold. There a request was made, which
the trial judge later ignored. In addition, the court was
adamant in not being understood as abandoning the rule
noted above in the Greene case. It said :
''Let it be distinctly understood, however, that by
anything we have said herein it is not intended
to, and we do not, modify the general rule laid
down by this Court in State v. Green, 33 Utah
479, 49 Pac. 987, and in Groot v. Railroad, 34 Utah
164, 96 Pac. 1019. Upon the contrary, we reaffirm
the general doctrine there stated.''
Thus, in the absence of a requested instruction, the defendant may not now complain. Wharton's Criminal Law
and Procedure, Vol. 5, p. 196.
It appears additionally, that the defendant's contention is not substantially well taken. As noted above,
the evidence was admissible for other reasons besides
credibility, since it disclosed motive, and rebutted character which was offered to prove guilt or innocence. Fur20
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ther, the wife's plea was relevant to the issue of whether
she was a prostitute. The Trial Court might well have
given some clarifying or additional instructions, if a request had been made, but even so, it does not appear that
prejudice resulted, especially since the jury was otherwise properly instructed with respect to their duties and
prerogatives. The language of State v. W oodaU, 6 U. 2d
8, 305 P. 2d 473 (1956), involving a similar crime, is noteworthy here, where much the same objection was raised.
The court said :
"It might very well be that if defendant had requested a specific instruction on former prostitution, he would have been entitled to it, but without
such request we cannot say that defendant was, by
the failure to give a special instruction on this
point, precluded from having a fair and pro:ger
determination of the issues.''
The same is apparent in the instant case, and the defendant's last point is, therefore, unmeritorious.
CONCLUSION
The defendant was given a full and fair trial within
the bounds of due process. The record makes manifeest
that the defendant's conduct, both in and out of the
coutroom, was the reason for his conviction, and not any
misconduct by the prosecution. The Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted
WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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